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Abstract 
The global drive towards decentralization has been increasingly justified on the basis that 
greater transfers of resources to subnational governments are expected to deliver greater 
efficiency in the provision of public goods and services and greater economic growth. This 
paper examines whether this is the case, by analysing the relationship between 
decentralization and economic growth in 21 OECD countries during the period between 1990 
and 2005 and controlling not only for fiscal decentralization, but also for political and 
administrative decentralization. The results point towards a negative and significant 
association between fiscal decentralization and economic growth in the sample countries, a 
relationship which is robust to the inclusion of a series of control variables and to differences 
in expenditure preferences by subnational governments. The impact of political and 
administrative decentralization on economic growth is weaker and sensitive to the definition 
and measurement of political decentralization. 
 
Keywords:  Fiscal decentralization, political decentralization, administrative decentralization, 
economic growth, OECD. 
 
JEL Classifications:  H40; H52 
3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The recent global drive towards fiscal decentralization has often been promoted as a 
means to achieve greater economic efficiency and growth. From the US to China, from 
Britain to Spain, greater transfers of resources and powers to subnational tiers of 
governments have been increasingly justified as a means to improve economic 
performance, both at the local and at the aggregate level, often sidelining the traditional 
arguments of safeguarding local identity or culture (Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008). 
This economic efficiency discourse has been prevalent both in cases of top-down fiscal 
decentralization, as in the US (Donohue, 1997) or the UK (Morgan, 2002; Tomaney, 
2002), as well as in bottom-up processes, where regions and localities have taken the 
lead in the process (e.g. Eusko Jauralitza, 2004).  
 
Yet the supposed ‘economic dividend’ (Morgan, 2002) derived from fiscal 
decentralization has seldom been tested and the studies which have ventured into 
exploring this field have come out with varying results. Although it is difficult to 
generalise from what is a literature that spawns across different countries of the world 
and uses a wide range of data sets and methods, the results of the studies which have 
looked into the economic returns of fiscal decentralization range from a positive and 
significant relationship (Iimi, 2005) to inverted U-shaped relationships (Thieβen, 2003)  
or neutral or mildly negative impacts (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 
1998; Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009).  
 
However, with few exceptions, this type of research has concentrated on individual 
countries. Cross-country comparisons are limited and those including a large number of 
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countries, such as those of the EU or the OECD, are few and far between (e.g.: Thießen, 
2003; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009). In addition, when testing the 
relationship between decentralization and growth, most of the literature has dwelt on 
one type of decentralization – fiscal decentralization – disregarding the fact that other 
types of decentralization, such as political and administrative decentralization, may also 
play a non-negligible role in shaping policies, the provision of public goods and 
services and, eventually, economic outcomes. The interaction between different types of 
decentralization is also likely to influence the returns of subnational expenditure and 
revenue efforts. 
 
In this paper we address this gap in the literature by looking at whether levels and 
changes in the levels of fiscal decentralization across 21 countries of the OECD during 
the period between 1990 and 2005 have had a positive or a negative effect on aggregate 
national economic performance. In order to achieve this aim, we not only examine the 
expenditure and revenue sides of fiscal decentralization, but we control for differences 
in political and administrative decentralization across countries, as well as for a host of 
other structural variables which, according to the literature, are considered to have an 
effect on economic performance. In addition, in order to further check the robustness of 
our results, we analyse whether the presence or absence of a significant association 
between fiscal decentralization and economic growth may be a result of differences in 
expenditure preferences by subnational governments. We specifically assess whether 
preferences for current or capital expenditures across regions and across countries in the 
OECD matter for economic growth, focusing later on the precise impact of the 
decentralization of economic affairs, health, education and social protection 
expenditure. 
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The paper is divided according to the following structure. First an overview of the 
theoretical arguments on the link between fiscal decentralization and growth follows 
this introduction. Section three weaves fiscal, political and administrative 
decentralization into a theoretical model. Section four presents the results of the analysis 
of the impact of decentralization on economic growth across the OECD. The final 
section introduces the main conclusions. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralization and growth: a theoretical overview. 
 
Most of the theoretical literature on fiscal decentralization has tended to dwell on the 
supposedly positive impact of granting greater financial autonomy or transferring 
resources to subnational tiers of government for both allocative and production 
efficiency and, eventually, economic growth (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972; Brennan and 
Buchanan, 1980).  
 
The arguments behind this potential positive association between fiscal decentralization 
and economic performance are based on a series of simple premises. An important, but 
often forgotten, initial premise is that fiscal decentralization implies a mobilization of 
resources. Subnational governments, by the simple fact of being granted greater 
autonomy and funds, are compelled into mobilizing the resources in their own territory, 
rather than wait for solutions or for the provision of public goods and services to come 
from a central, more remote, authority. This leads to a greater emphasis on economic 
efficiency across regions and localities within any given country and to tapping into 
what otherwise may have been untapped potential.  
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The best known mechanism through which fiscal decentralization may lead to greater 
overall economic efficiency is the so-called ‘fiscal decentralization’ theorem: the fact 
that, due to informational advantages and a better insight into the preferences of 
citizens, local governments are more capable than national governments to tailor the 
provision of public goods and services to the needs of local citizens (Tiebout, 1956; 
Klugman, 1994). The possible economic advantages linked to the fiscal decentralization 
theorem increase the larger and the more heterogeneous the country. Whether in small 
and homogenous countries the informational benefits of conducting policies and 
providing public goods and services at the local level may be limited, the advantages of 
fiscal decentralization increase as internal heterogeneity makes individual preferences 
more diverse (Oates, 1993; Martínez-Vázquez and McNab, 2003). From this 
perspective, significant benefits from fiscal decentralization can be expected beyond a 
certain country-size threshold. 
 
Greater production efficiency and growth may also be triggered by the changes in scale 
for the production of public policies and  goods and services that fiscal decentralization 
entails. The risk of citizens and firms being able to ‘vote with their feet’ and move to 
another location drives local governments to compete in order provide better and more 
efficient policies (Tiebout, 1956; Donahue, 1997; Martínez-Vázquez and McNab 2003). 
Through competition, local governments are kept on their toes limiting the possibility of 
inefficiency, rent-seeking and corrupt practices (Breton, 1996). Competition, in turn, is 
at the heart of policy innovation. The smaller the geographical scale of intervention, the 
lower the risks involved in – and the aggregate cost of – pursuing innovation in the 
provision of public goods and services. Successful local policies can then be transferred 
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from one place to another, possibly leading to significant aggregate efficiency gains 
(Donohue, 1997). Fiscal decentralization is also frequently considered a means to 
promote more efficient markets (McKinnon, 1997; Marks and Hooghe, 2004). 
 
Decentralization also brings about important benefits in cases where serious 
diseconomies of scale exist. It is often the case that the cost of producing certain public 
goods tends to rise significantly with size. This is particularly true when the delivery of 
public goods and services is done by large, remote and/or often inefficient central 
bureaucracies (Klugman 1994). These bureaucracies are frequently less well suited to 
deliver specific public goods more efficiently than the more supple local governments, 
as a consequence of their closeness to the people and their better knowledge of their 
needs. Local delivery also shortens supply chains and reduces costs, potentially 
generating greater economic efficiency and even reducing the risks associated with the 
loss of redistributive power by the central government (Ezcurra and Pascual 2008). 
 
Last but not least, fiscal decentralization is often considered as a way to increase 
participation, transparency and accountability in policy-making (Putnam, 1993; Ebel 
and Yilmaz, 2002). Because of the enhanced proximity between those governing and 
those governed, fiscal decentralization empowers individuals and helps to generate 
institutions, such as greater trust, interaction and networking, which, in turn, contribute 
to a reduction of transaction costs. 
 
While, from a theoretical perspective, there may be significant benefits associated with 
fiscal decentralization, many authors have tended to focus on the other side of the coin: 
that of the potential risks of decentralization for economic performance. First of all, 
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certain strands of research have cast doubt on the validity of the ‘fiscal decentralization 
theorem’. Needs and wants for public goods and services may not differ significantly 
across jurisdictions. Prud’homme argues that more than responding to “fine differences 
in preferences between jurisdictions [governments have] to satisfy basic needs, which 
are – at least in principle – quite well known” (1995: 208). These basic needs of access 
to food, to decent education, to safety, to health care, to basic infrastructure, and to other 
basic services are universal and do not differ greatly from one region to another and the 
central government may be better suited to deliver these goods. Second, even if we 
accept that needs vary across territories, capacity constraints may limit the potential of 
subnational governments to make the most from fiscal autonomy (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Gill, 2005). It is far from proven that local and regional governments have a clear 
comparative advantage with respect to national governments in uncovering those 
differences (Prud’homme, 1995).  
 
Poorer localities and regions may also be at a further disadvantage in delivering 
efficient policies and strategies. Often times subnational governments – especially in the 
less developed regions – lack the adequate expertise and human resources to put in 
place viable policies and strategies, let alone to tailor those policies to the specific needs 
of their citizens (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 2004; Sapir et al. 2005). Because of the 
generally greater salaries and the greater possibilities for promotion they offer, central 
governments may have better and more efficient administrations than local and regional 
governments, especially if these governments are poor, distant and strapped for cash 
(Prud’homme 1995). Moreover, richer and more dynamic regions can generally extract 
greater resources, either through the taxation of their own citizens or through a greater 
political leverage to negotiate with the central government (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill 
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2004).  Limited local institutional capabilities may even undermine the capacity to 
assimilate and adopt best practices (Oates, 1993; Odero, 2004). Local governments may 
also fall prey to elite and special-interest capture (Inman and Rubinfeld, 2000; Storper, 
2005) and may be likely to breed greater corruption, nepotism and clientelism.  
 
Scale arguments may also be reversed. When large economies of scale and scope are 
involved, local and regional governments often lack the necessary size to deliver public 
goods and services efficiently – with the provision of transport infrastructure or utilities 
being most at risk to fall into inefficiencies (Prud’homme, 1995). The benefits of central 
government delivery are thus likely to be greater for capital intensive goods, where a 
critical mass of investment is needed in order to reduce the per-unit cost of delivery 
(Frenkel, 1986). 
 
Given the points above, the possibility of matching policies to the specific needs of the 
population may simply be a pipedream, as local and regional governments often do not 
have the necessary powers, resources, capacity and capabilities to be able to adequately 
address local problems. Inadequate or unfunded mandates are common in processes of 
decentralization and tend to seriously compromise the potential of subnational 
governments to deliver better targeted and more efficient policies than those of national 
governments (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2003).  
 
Whether the positive or the negative economic effects of fiscal decentralization prevail 
cannot be established using theory alone. The empirical work on the economic effects of 
decentralization has been limited and, as mentioned earlier, generally reaches diverging 
conclusions. The reasons for this diversity are that determining the impact of 
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decentralization on local and regional development empirically is difficult. There is no 
clear agreement about how to best measure decentralization (Ebel and Yilmaz 2002: 6-
7) and, even when the same indicators are used, the methods and approaches vary 
enormously. In addition, there is hardly ever a counterfactual, making it impossible to 
discern what would have happened to local and regional growth trajectories in the 
absence of decentralization.  
 
As a consequence, the question of whether decentralization promotes or deters 
economic efficiency across the world is far from settled and available empirical 
analyses virtually fit every possible position. Some studies have found that there is a 
positive association between decentralization and economic performance (Lin and Liu, 
2000; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 2005). Others, in contrast, indicate that the 
relationship can be negative (e.g. Davoodi and Zou 1998; Zhang and Zou 1998 and 
2001). While most tend to highlight that the link between decentralization and economic 
growth varies from one region and one country to another and, in most cases, tends to 
be either neutral or insignificant (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Phillips, 1998; 
Rodríguez-Pose and Bwire, 2004) or far from linear [e.g. Thießen (2003) uncovers a 
hump-shaped relationship between decentralization and development, indicating the 
potential existence of an optimal level of decentralization across countries] (Table 1). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
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3. Fiscal, political and administrative decentralization: the model. 
 
The aim of this section is to test empirically the practical relevance of the contrasting 
theoretical arguments on the link between the degree of fiscal decentralization from 
central to subnational governments and economic performance for 21 OECD countries 
during the period between 1990 and 2005.  
 
The first feature that strikes about fiscal decentralization in the OECD is its diversity. If 
we take two widely used standard measures of fiscal decentralization – the subnational 
share in total government expenditure and the subnational share in total government 
revenue (e.g. Oates, 1985, 1993; Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Woller and Philips, 1998; 
Thießen; 2003; Iimi, 2005)1 – the degree of fiscal decentralization varies considerably 
across the different countries in the sample. The most fiscally decentralized countries 
are Switzerland, Germany and Canada, while at the opposite end of the scale, we find 
Portugal, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom. The relative gap in the degree of fiscal 
decentralization between Switzerland, the most decentralised country in the OECD, and 
Portugal, the most centralised in the sample, is of an order of 4.6 times in terms of 
expenditure and 3.9 times in terms of revenue (Table 2). Moreover, the level of fiscal 
                                                 
1
 All the measures of fiscal decentralization used in the paper are based on time series data 
gathered by the International Monetary Fund in its Government and Finance Statistics database. 
It should be noted that none of these indicators perfectly reflects all the dimensions and the 
complexity of the processes of fiscal decentralization. Specifically, both expenditure and 
revenue indicators have been criticized for failing to identify the degree of expenditure 
autonomy of subnational governments, for failing to differentiate between tax and non-tax 
revenue sources, and for not determining what proportion of intergovernmental transfers are 
discretionary or conditional (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; Rodden, 2004; Stegarescu, 2005). 
Nevertheless, lack of detailed information on the exact nature of the relations between the 
different government levels in each country leaves us with no reliable alternative for large cross-
country comparisons (Thießen, 2003; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). 
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decentralization from central to subnational governments did not remain stable over the 
period of analysis. Although there is no uniform pattern in this context, most of the 
sample countries experienced an increase in their degree of fiscal decentralization 
between 1990 and 2005, which is in line with the devolutionary trend observed 
worldwide since the late 1970s (Dillinger, 1994; Woller and Phillips, 1998; World 
Bank, 2000; Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). Notable examples of this trend are Spain 
and Mexico. In these two countries the decentralization processes were particularly 
intense, with increases in subnational expenditure of more than 20 percent in both cases 
and of almost 11 percent in Spain and 36 percent in Mexico in terms of subnational 
revenue (Table 2), continuing the devolutionary tendency already observed during the 
1980s (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2004). However, the trend towards greater fiscal 
decentralization has not been universal. Six of the 21 countries included in the sample 
witnessed a relative reduction in subnational expenditure – with a particularly strong 
incidence in the case of Norway – while seven countries experienced a contraction in 
the relative weight of subnational revenue (Table 2). The process of marginal 
recentralization was dominant in Scandinavian countries, and in particular in Norway 
and Finland.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
Has the tendency towards greater fiscal decentralization been associated with economic 
growth across the OECD?  Figures 1 and 2 plot the average growth rate of real GDP per 
capita over the study period on the average values of the two measures of fiscal 
decentralization considered and give an initial assessment of the main research question 
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driving the paper. The simple linear association between both phenomena seems to 
show the existence of a negative relationship between the degree of fiscal 
decentralization and the economic growth in OECD countries between 1990 and 2005. 
The corresponding correlation coefficients, with values of 0.436 (p-value = 0.048) and 
0.472 (p-value = 0.031), for expenditure and revenue respectively, confirm this 
impression. Neither of the plots is affected by significant outliers which may be behind 
this pattern. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
INSERT FIGURE 2 AROUND HERE 
 
The information provided by Figures 1 and 2 should, in any case, be interpreted with 
caution, as economic growth does not depend exclusively on the degree of fiscal 
decentralization of a country (Davoodi and Zou, 1998; Akai and Sakata, 2002; Iimi, 
2005; Thornton, 2007) and omitted variables may ultimately lie behind the observed 
negative relationship. In addition, the transfer of power and resources from central to 
subnational governments is a multidimensional process (Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002; 
Stegarescu, 2005) and the potential influence of the degree of fiscal decentralization on 
economic performance may be affected by country differences in political and 
administrative decentralization.  
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In view of this, and in order to really test whether fiscal decentralization matters for 
economic growth, we estimate of the following econometric model: 
c
t
c
t
ccc
t
c
tt ADPDFDg εγδβα +++++=−+ θX)5(
            
(1) 
where g is the average growth rate of real GDP per capita in country c; FD, PD and AD 
are respectively the measures of fiscal, political and administrative decentralization; X 
is a vector of variables that control for other factors that are assumed to influence 
growth; and finally ε is the corresponding disturbance term. Our main interest lies in the 
coefficient of the variable capturing the effect of the degree of fiscal decentralization 
(FD) – both on the expenditure and the revenue side – of the sample countries. As this 
variable is not expected to affect year-to-year fluctuations in growth, we work with 
growth rates averaged over five-year periods, as is usual in the literature. All the 
estimations of model (1) carried out in this section are based on heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors (Newey and West, 1987, 1994).  
 
Fiscal decentralization is, however, not the only type of decentralization that may have 
some bearing on economic performance. Processes of decentralization are not limited to 
the transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government (fiscal decentralization), but 
also include varying degrees of transfers of powers (political decentralization) and the 
granting of autonomy to subcentral entities relative to central government 
(administrative decentralization). No two processes of decentralization are equal and 
there is often a mismatch between the levels of fiscal, political and administrative 
decentralization. Differences in legitimacy between subnational actors, on the one hand, 
and the central or federal state, on the other, are often at the root of huge cross-country 
variations in transfers of political power and economic resources to subnational 
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governments (Donohue, 1997). Top-down processes of decentralization are, in 
particular, characterised by a mismatch between a significant transfer of powers and an 
often limited transfer of resources to subnational tiers of government (Rodríguez-Pose 
and Gill, 2003). OECD countries are no exception and the majority of the countries 
included in the sample register significant differences between their degree of fiscal, 
political and administrative decentralization (Schneider, 2003). 
 
As in the case of fiscal decentralization, measurements of political and administrative 
decentralization are not without controversy. Virtually every individual or group of 
researchers who have looked into this question have come out with a different index for 
these two types of decentralization. Two well-known sources of indicators of political 
decentralization are Schneider (2003) and Hooghe et al. (2008). Schneider’s (2003) 
indices have the advantage of a greater territorial breadth of coverage, including all 21 
countries in our sample, and make an explicit distinction between political and 
administrative decentralization. The main drawback is that Schneider’s (2003) index is 
only available for 1996, which limits the potential to apply certain econometric models. 
Hooghe et al. (2008) indices are richer and cover a relatively large number of political, 
fiscal and institutional aspects of decentralization – including, among others, aspects 
such as institutional depts., policy scope, fiscal autonomy, representation or executive 
control – for 42 countries during the period between 1950 and 2006. They also allow for 
a limited variation over time. Measures of administrative decentralization are, however, 
less explicitly covered than in Schneider’s (2003) index and one of the countries in our 
sample (Mexico) is not included. None of the two sets of indicators is exempt from 
criticism and there is significant variation in the results. Consequently, the use of one or 
the other set of indicators implies considerable risks and may bias the results. We are 
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therefore resorting to both Schneider’s (2003) and Hooghe et al.’s2 (2008) indices as our 
proxies for political decentralization.  
 
The X vector includes different variables identified in the literature as potentially 
important determinants of economic growth (Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004). In addition to 
the initial GDP per capita of every country, we consider the level of physical and human 
capital, measured respectively as the net capital stock per unit of GDP and the average 
years of schooling of the total population aged 15 and over. We also include the average 
population growth rate and the degree of trade openness, calculated following standard 
practice as the ratio between total trade (exports and imports) and GDP. As the observed 
link between fiscal decentralization and economic growth may be a spurious correlation 
resulting from ignoring existing differences in the size of the public sector in the various 
countries (Ram, 1986; Mo, 2007), we introduce the public sector size as our final 
control variable. Public sector size is measured as the share of total public expenditure 
in national GDP3. 
 
With the only exception of the population growth rate and the time-invariant measures 
of political – Schneider’s (2003) index – and administrative decentralization, all the 
explanatory variables were measured at the beginning of the corresponding five-year 
                                                 
2
 In the case of Hooghe et al.’s (2008) indices, we resort to their policy scope indicator as the 
measure of political decentralization. The policy scope indicator “taps regional authority over 
policy making” (Hooghe et al., 2008: 125). In this index these authors estimate “the range of 
policies over which governments make authoritative decisions” in areas related to economic, 
cultura-educational and welfare policies, as well as over aspects of constitutive or coercive 
authority and over membership of the community (Hoogher et al., 2008: 125-126). 
 
3
 The data for these variables are drawn from different sources, which include the World 
Development Indicators (World Bank), AMECO (European Commission), Barro and Lee 
(2000), and the International Monetary Fund’s Government and Finance Statistics. 
17 
 
period in order to minimize any potential endogeneity problem. Table 3 provides 
different descriptive statistics for the different variables employed in our analysis.  
 
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
 
4. The relationship between fiscal decentralization and growth in the 
OECD. 
 
Table 4 presents the results obtained when different versions of model (1) are estimated 
by OLS using the subnational share in total government expenditure as the measure of 
fiscal decentralization. As can be observed, the inclusion of this indicator in our 
reduced-form growth model yields interesting results. First and foremost, the coefficient 
of the measure of fiscal decentralization is in all cases negative and statistically 
significant. This indicates that the subnational share in total government expenditure is 
negatively associated with economic growth in the sample countries, which is consistent 
with the preliminary evidence provided by Figure 1. The different specifications 
estimated in Table 4 show that this finding is robust to the inclusion of additional 
explanatory variables in the analysis (Regressions 4.2 to 4.7) and to differences in the 
measurement of political decentralization (Regressions 4.2, 4.5 and 4.7). Accordingly, 
decentralization of public expenditure has a negative and robust impact on national 
economic performance across the OECD between 1990 and 2005.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
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Considering the possibility of a non-linear inverted U-shaped relationship between 
fiscal decentralization and economic growth (Thießen, 2003), we incorporated the 
square of the measure of fiscal decentralization employed as an additional regressor. 
However, as the results in regressions 4.4 and 4.6 of Table 4 indicate, the corresponding 
coefficient was not statistically significant. 
 
Administrative decentralization, as measured by Schneider (2003), also matters for 
growth. The association between both variables is negative and significant (Regression 
4.2). Nevertheless, some caution is required when interpreting this result, since in the 
full model the coefficient of the indicator of the level of administrative decentralization 
is statistically significant only at the 10% level (Regression 4.6) and the variable is non-
significant when introducing Hooghe et al.’s (2008) index of political decentralization 
(Regression 4.7). The impact of political decentralization on national economic 
performance is affected by the choice of variable. When using Schneider’s (2003) 
political decentralization index, the coefficient is not statistically significant in any case, 
which appears to suggest that the degree to which the central government allows 
subcentral entities to carry out the political functions of governance does not affect 
economic growth (Regressions 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6). If we resort to Hooghe et al.’s (2008) 
political decentralization indicator (Regression 4.7), the coefficient in contrast points to 
– as in the case of fiscal and administrative decentralization – a negative and statistically 
significant relationship with economic growth, reinforcing the view that decentralization 
seems to have a detrimental effect on economic performance. 
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The various variables included in vector X tend to display the expected coefficients. The 
coefficient of initial GDP per capita is negative and statistically significant in all the 
specifications considered, indicating the existence of a process of conditional 
convergence across the sample countries (Barro, 1991; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). 
The analysis carried out also reveals that the stock of physical and human capital, and 
the degree of trade openness are positively correlated with the dependent variable, while 
the population growth rate is not statistically significant, with the exception of 
regression 4.7 (Table 4). Finally, the negative relationship observed between the 
subnational share in total government expenditure and economic performance is not 
affected by the inclusion of public sector size in the analysis. This variable is not 
statistically significant when the indicators of the degree of political and administrative 
decentralization are taken into account in the estimation of the model (Table 4). 
 
In order to confirm whether the negative link between fiscal decentralization and 
economic growth is robust, the analysis presented in Table 4 is repeated using the 
subnational share in total government revenue as the proxy for the degree of fiscal 
decentralization across the OECD. The results are shown in Table 5. In all cases higher 
levels of decentralized revenues are associated with lower growth rates in the ensuing 
years, which is in line with the empirical evidence provided by Table 4. Likewise, the 
coefficients of the remaining explanatory variables are basically a carbon copy of those 
presented in Table 4. Administrative decentralization is negatively connected with 
economic performance and the relationship between political decentralization and 
growth is affected by the choice of indicator: Schneider’s (2003) political 
decentralization index is completely dissociated from economic performance, while 
Hooghe et al.’s (2008) indicator displays, once again, a negative and significant 
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coefficient (Table 5). The control variables included in the analysis have similar 
coefficients to those discussed in Table 4, the only exception being the coefficient of the 
indicator of the public sector size, which is now positive and statistically significant in 
the full model, but not in regression 5.7 (Table 5). 
 
INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE 
 
This negative association between fiscal decentralization and economic performance 
may be the consequence, as stated in the theoretical section, of differences in policy 
preferences by subnational governments, which may undermine overall growth 
potential. In order to test whether this is the case, we investigate, following Rodríguez-
Pose et al. (2009), the role played in this context by current and capital expenditures. 
We estimate model (1) again, replacing the measures of fiscal decentralization 
employed so far with the subnational share in total government current expenditure and 
the subnational share in total government capital expenditure. Preferences for capital 
expenditure to the detriment of current expenditure are expected to have a higher impact 
on subsequent growth. Conversely, preferences for current expenditure may be 
detrimental for growth (Devrajan et al., 1996; Kneller et al., 1999). As shown in Table 
6, the results of this analysis allow us to partially qualify our previous findings. With 
respect to the degree of decentralization of current expenditure, our estimates reveal the 
presence of an inverted U-shaped link between this variable and economic growth. 
Accordingly, the relationship under study is positive when the level of decentralization 
of current expenditure is increasing from relatively low levels, but beyond a certain 
threshold it turns negative. This raises the possibility of using the decentralization of 
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current expenditure as a means to increase economic growth in relatively centralized 
countries, but also highlights the economic risks associated with increases in current 
expenditure in highly decentralized countries. By contrast, the results for the degree of 
decentralization of capital expenditure do not provide any evidence of a non-linear link 
with growth. The coefficient of this variable is in all cases negative and statistically 
significant, as occurs with the measures of fiscal decentralization employed in Tables 4 
and 5. 
 
The division of subnational expenditure between current and capital expenditure affects 
the coefficients of political and administrative decentralization (Table 6). Using 
Schneider’s (2003) index, the degree of political decentralization now seems to exert a 
positive influence on economic growth, while the degree of administrative 
decentralization is not statistically significant in most cases. But this association of 
political decentralization with economic growth is sensitive to the choice of index used. 
When resorting to Hooghe at al.’s (2008) index, the impact of political decentralization 
is marginally negative and significant, when controlling for the fiscal decentralization of 
current expenditures, and negative but not significant, when controlling for capital 
expenditures (Table A1 in Appendix). As in the case of the results reported in Tables 4 
and 5, the effect of these variables on economic growth is contingent on the measure of 
decentralization used. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE 
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By threading at a finer level and considering the impact of the subnational share in total 
government expenditure on economic affairs, health, education and social protection, 
we aim to complete the picture and further analyse the robustness of our previous 
findings. These four decentralization indicators are included as explanatory variables in 
model (1). The results of this analysis are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The estimates 
carried out reveal that the coefficients of these variables are negative and statistically 
significant in all cases, regardless of the controls used in the analysis. This confirms the 
existence of a negative relationship between the level of the decentralization of these 
types of expenditure and the dependent variable. That is, the level of decentralization of 
expenditure on economic affairs, health, education and social protection is negatively 
correlated with economic growth. Likewise, the empirical evidence supplied by Tables 
7 and 8 does not suggest the presence of a non-linear link between these measures of 
fiscal decentralization and economic performance in the sample countries. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that different preferences for expenditure among subnational 
governments affect the link between political and fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth and that this relationship is, once again, contingent on the choice of indicator. 
When resorting to Schneider’s (2003) index, political decentralization is positively and 
significantly associated with growth in the cases of territories with a preference for 
expenditure on economics affairs and education, but not in the case of health and social 
protection (Tables 7 and 8). Using Hooghe et al.’s (2008) index, political 
decentralization is negatively connected to economic performance in the cases of 
preferences for health, education and social protection expenditure, but not in cases of 
preferences for economic affairs expenditure (Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix). 
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INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE 
 
INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
 
The aim of the paper has been to tackle the question of whether fiscal decentralization is 
beneficial for economic growth or not. The often positive way in which fiscal 
decentralization has been portrayed by proponents of devolution – almost as a solution 
to the economic ills of well-off and lagging-behind regions alike – has for long 
contrasted with the contradicting results of the scholarly analyses which have delved 
into the question from different perspectives and in different parts of the world. We 
have hence sought to revisit this matter from a somewhat distinct angle to that of 
previous studies. First, we have concentrated our analysis on a group of relatively 
wealthy nations belonging to the OECD for the period 1990 to 2005. While this sort of 
approach is not new (Thießen, 2003; Thornton, 2007; Baskaran and Feld, 2009), it has 
the advantage of reducing the noise that the comparison of countries with widely 
diverse starting points and levels of wealth would introduce. Second and perhaps most 
importantly, we have approached fiscal decentralization not as a unique, self-standing 
phenomenon, but one which is inserted in a broader process of decentralization. 
Decentralization is by no means dominated by revenue and expenditure issues and it is 
often the case that political and administrative decisions play an equal, if not more 
important role, in decisions about whether to decentralize further or not. As a 
consequence, we have introduced a number of measures of political and administrative 
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decentralization into the analysis, in order to unveil the interaction among these three 
types of decentralization and between them and economic performance. Third, as a 
means to check the robustness of the results, the paper considers both the expenditure 
and the revenue side of decentralization, as well as, within the expenditure side, how 
different the various expenditure preferences of subnational governments – ranging 
from current to capital expenditure and more specifically focusing on preference by 
subnational governments for economic affairs, health, education or welfare expenditure 
– affect the relationship between fiscal decentralization and economic performance. 
Finally, as an additional robustness test, we control for a series of structural factors 
which have traditionally been regarded as influencing economic performance. 
 
The results of the analysis highlight that, given the recent levels of fiscal 
decentralization of the countries of the OECD, fiscal decentralization seems to be 
causing more harm than good from a growth perspective. The connection between fiscal 
decentralization and economic performance is negative, significant and robust to the 
inclusion of measurements of political and administrative decentralization and of a 
number of control variables. It is also not affected by whether we are looking at the 
expenditure or the revenue side of decentralization or by preferences for specific types 
of expenditure by subnational governments. The association also seems to be linear, 
with little indication of an inverted U-shaped relationship: the negative impact of 
decentralization on economic growth rises as countries in the OECD intensify the fiscal 
decentralization process. And this negative relationship happens regardless of whether 
decentralized governments display preferences for capital or current expenditure or feel 
more inclined to promote health, education, welfare expenditure or choose expenditure 
in economic affairs. The only exception to this trend happens in cases of preferences for 
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current expenditure in relatively low levels of fiscal decentralization. In these cases 
there is some margin of manoeuvre for governments, as moderate increases in fiscal 
decentralization may have a positive impact on economic growth.   
 
The negative association between fiscal decentralization and growth is more robust than 
that between other types of decentralization and growth. Administrative decentralization 
also tends to display a negative connection to economic performance, although this 
connection is weaker and less robust than that of fiscal decentralization. Political 
decentralization exhibits a relationship with economic growth that is highly sensitive to 
the choice of measurement of political decentralization. With some types of indicators 
political decentralization has a positive impact on economic growth, while, with others, 
the connection is negative. But these differences linked to the choice of indicators of 
political decentralization do not in any case affect the robustness of the negative 
association between fiscal decentralization and growth. 
 
Overall, the analysis shows that, at least in the case of OECD countries, the potential 
economic benefits of fiscal decentralization in terms of economic performance are more 
than counterweighed by the potential economic pitfalls of transferring ever greater 
resources to subnational tiers of government. Political and administrative measures of 
decentralization seem to be unable to offset this trend. Hence, in the case of the OECD, 
while fiscal decentralization may still be an adequate way to preserve and promote 
regional identity and culture, the claim that it will also bring about some sort of 
economic dividend can be considered as questionable. 
 
26 
 
References 
 
Akai, N. and Sakata, M. (2002): Fiscal decentralization contributes to economic growth: 
evidence from state-level cross-section data for the United States, Journal of 
Urban Economics 52, 93-108. 
Barro, R.J. (1991): Economic growth in a cross-section of countries, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 106, 407-444. 
Barro, R.J. and Lee, J.W. (2000): International data on educational attainment: Updates 
and implications. Working Paper No. 042, Center for International Development 
(CID), Harvard University.  
Barro, R.J. and Sala-i-Martin, X. (1992): Convergence, Journal of Political Economy 
100, 407-443. 
Baskaran, T. and Feld, L.P. (2009): Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in 
OECD Countries: Is there a relationship? CESIFO Working Paper No. 2721. 
Brennan, G. and Buchanan, J.M. (1980): The power to tax: Analytical foundations of a 
fiscal constitution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Breton, A. (1996): Competitive governments: An economic theory of politics and public 
finance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Davoodi, H. and Zou, H. (1998): Fiscal decentralization and economic growth: a cross 
country study, Journal of Urban Economics 43, 244-257. 
Devrajan S, Swaroop, V. and Zou, H.-F. (1996): The composition of public expenditure 
and economic growth. Journal of Monetary Economics 37:313-344. 
Dillinger, W. (1994): Decentralization and its implications for urban service delivery. 
Urban Management Program Discussion Paper 16, World Bank. 
Donohue, J.D. (1997): Disunited States. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
Ebel, R.D. and Yilmaz, S. (2002): On the measurement and impact of fiscal 
decentralization, Policy Research Working Paper 2809, World Bank. 
Eusko Jaularitiza (2004)  Razones económicas para un nuevo Marco Institucional, 
available at: http://www.lehendakaritza.ejgv.euskadi.net/r48-
27 
 
2312/es/contenidos/informes/mem_razones_economicas/es_7465/razones_econo
micas.html. 
Ezcurra, R. and Pascual, P. (2008): The link between fiscal decentralization and 
regional disparities: Evidence from several European Union countries, 
Environment and Planning A 40, 1185-1201. 
Frenkel, M. (1986): Federal theory. Canberra,: Centre for Research on Federal Financial 
Relations, Australian National University. 
Hooghe, L., Marks, G. and Schakel, A.H. (2008): Regional authority in 42 democracies, 
1950–2006: A measure and five hypotheses, Regional and Federal Studies 18(2-
3): 111-302. 
Iimi, A. (2005): Decentralization and economic growth revisited: an empirical note, 
Journal of Urban Economics 57, 449-461. 
Inman, R.P., and Rubinfeld, D. L. (2000): Federalism. In The Encyclopedia of Law and 
Economics Volume V. 
Klugman, J. (1994): Decentralisation: A survey of literature from a human development 
perspective. New York: United Nations Development Programme Occasional 
Paper 13 Human Development Report Office. 
Kneller, R., Bleaney, M. and Gemmell, N. (1999): Fiscal policy and growth: Evidence 
from OECD countries. Journal of Public Economics 74:171-190. 
Lin, J.Y., and Liu, Z. (2000): Fiscal decentralization and economic growth in China, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 49, 1-21. 
Martínez-Vázquez, J. and McNab, R.M. (2003): Fiscal decentralization and economic 
growth, World Development 31, 1597-1616.  
Marks, G. and Hooghe, L. (2004): Contrasting visions of multi-level governance. In 
Multi-level governance, edited by I. Bache and M. Flinders. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
McKinnon, R (1997): Market-preserving fiscal federalism in the American Monetary 
Union. In Blejer, M. and Ter-Minassian, T., eds., Macroeconomic Dimensions 
of Public Finance: Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi, 73-93. London: Routledge. 
Mo, P.H. (2007): Government expenditures and economic growth: The supply and 
demand sides, Fiscal Studies 28, 497-522. 
28 
 
Morgan, K. (2002): The English Question: Regional perspectives on a fractured nation. 
Regional Studies, 36 797-810. 
Newey, W.K. and West, K.D. (1987): Hypothesis testing with efficient method of 
moments estimation, International Economic Review 28, 777–787. 
Newey, W.K. and West, K.D. (1994): Automatic lag selection in covariance matrix 
estimation, Review of Economic Studies 61, 631–653. 
Oates, W. (1972): Fiscal federalism. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich 
Oates, W. (1985): Searching for Leviathan: An empirical analysis, American Economic 
Review 75, 748-757. 
Oates, W. (1993): Fiscal decentralization and economic development, National Tax 
Journal XLVI, 237-243. 
Odero, K.K. (2004): PRSPs in decentralized contexts: Comparative lessons on local 
planning and fiscal dimensions. Washington DC: World Bank Publications. 
Prud’homme, R. (1995): The dangers of decentralization, World Bank Research 
Observer 10, 201-220. 
Putnam, R.D. (1993): Making democracy work: Civic traditions in modern Italy.  
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Ram, R. (1986): Government size and economic growth: a new framework and some 
evidence from cross-section and time series data, American Economic Review 76, 
191- 203. 
Rodden, J. (2004): Comparative federalism and decentralization: On meaning and 
measurement, Comparative Politics 36, 481-500. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Bwire, A. (2004): The economic (in)efficiency of devolution, 
Environment and Planning A 36, 1907-1928. 
Rodríguez- Pose, A. and Gill, N. (2003): The global trend towards devolution and its 
implications, Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 21, 333-351. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Gill, N. (2004): Is there a global link between regional 
disparities and devolution?, Environment and Planning A 36, 2097-2117. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Gill, N. (2005): On the “economic dividend” of devolution, 
Regional Studies  39, 405-420. 
29 
 
Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Sandall, R. (2008): From identity to the economy: analysing the 
evolution of the decentralisation discourse. Environment and Planning C: 
Government and Policy 26, 54-72. 
Rodríguez-Pose, A., Tijmstra, S. and Bwire, A. (2009): Fiscal decentralisation, 
efficiency, and growth, Environment and Planning A 41, 2041-2062. 
Sala-i-Martin, X., Doppelhofer, G. and Miller, R.I. (2004): Determinants of long-term 
growth: a Bayesian averaging of classical estimates (BACE) approach, American 
Economic Review 94, 813-835. 
Sapir, A. et al. (2004): An agenda for a growing Europe: the Sapir report. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Schneider, A. (2003): Decentralization: conceptualization and measurement, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 38, 32-56. 
Stansel, D. (2005): Local decentralization and local economic growth: A cross-sectional 
examination of US metropolitan areas, Journal of Urban Economics 57: 55-72.   
Stegarescu, D. (2005): Public sector decentralisation: Measurement concepts and recent 
international trends, Fiscal Studies 26, 301-333. 
Storper, M. (2005): Society, community and economic development, Studies in 
Comparative International Development 39, 30-57. 
Tiebout, C.M. (1956): A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political 
Economy 64 (5): 416-424. 
Thießen, U. (2003): Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth in high-income OECD 
countries, Fiscal Studies 24, 237-274. 
Thornton, J. (2007): Fiscal decentralization and economic growth reconsidered, Journal 
of Urban Economics 61, 64-70. 
Tomaney, J. (2002): The evolution of regionalism in England, Regional Studies 36, 
721-731. 
Woller, G.M. and Phillips, K. (1998): Fiscal decentralization and IDC economic 
growth: An empirical investigation, Journal of Development Studies 34, 139-148. 
World Bank (2000): World Development Report 1999/2000. Entering the 21st Century. 
Washington: World Bank. 
30 
 
Zhang, T , and Zou, H. (1998): Fiscal decentralization, public spending and economic 
growth in China, Journal of Public Economics 67,221-240. 
Zhang, T. and Zou, H. (2001): The growth impact of intersectoral and 
intergovernmental allocation of public expenditure: With applications to China 
and India, China Economic Review 2, 58-81. 
 
31 
 
Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1: The link between decentralisation and economic performance. 
 
 
Author (year) 
 
 
Sample 
 
Period 
 
Findings 
Akai and Sakata 
(2002) 
 
USA 1988-
1996 
Positive and significant 
Baskaran and Feld 
(2009) 
 
23 OECD 
countries 
1975-
2001 
Negative, but not robust 
Davoodi and Zou 
(1998) 
 
46 countries 1970-
1989 
Developing: negative, but not 
significant 
OECD: no relationship 
Iimi (2005) 
 
51 countries 1997-
2001 
Positive and significant 
Lin and Liu (2000) 
 
China 1970-
1993 
Positive and significant 
Rodríguez-Pose and 
Bwire (2004) 
Germany, 
India, Italy, 
Mexico, Spain 
and US  
Different 
periods 
until 2001 
Mostly insignificant, with the 
exceptions of Mexico, the US, 
and, partially, India, where it 
becomes negative  
Stansel (2005) US 
metropolitan 
areas 
1960-
1990 
Positive and significant 
Thießen (2003) 
 
26 countries 1973-
1998 
Hump-shaped relationship 
Thornton (2007) 19 OECD 
countries 
1980-
2000 
Not statistically significant 
Woller and Phillips 
(1998) 
 
23 LDC’s 1974-
1991 
No relationship 
Zhang and Zou 
(1998) 
 
China 1980-
1992 
Negative and significant 
Zhang and Zou 
(2001) 
 
China  1987-
1993 
Negative and significant 
Source: Adapted and updated from Rodríguez-Pose et al. (2009). 
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Table 2: Fiscal decentralization trends in the OECD countries, 1990-2005. 
 
Decentralization Total expenditure Total revenue 
Country Mean Std. Dev. ∆ (%) Mean Std. Dev. ∆ (%) 
Australia 0.383 0.012 -0.88 0.400 0.016 0.10 
Austria 0.416 0.013 -1.15 0.463 0.023 -4.35 
Belgium 0.437 0.022 4.56 0.455 0.013 3.89 
Canada 0.603 0.019 6.34 0.626 0.009 0.91 
Denmark 0.509 0.014 0.08 0.501 0.009 0.48 
Finland 0.480 0.026 -6.06 0.532 0.071 -7.52 
France 0.301 0.013 0.13 0.334 0.015 5.36 
Germany 0.608 0.075 13.67 0.680 0.024 5.99 
Iceland 0.265 0.044 11.18 0.291 0.037 13.18 
Ireland 0.274 0.025 7.26 0.293 0.036 -7.88 
Italy 0.328 0.055 14.92 0.394 0.030 4.03 
Luxembourg 0.204 0.012 -5.11 0.216 0.008 -0.88 
Mexico 0.332 0.077 28.29 0.380 0.102 35.98 
Netherlands 0.374 0.021 5.35 0.427 0.035 -5.94 
Norway 0.349 0.062 -21.73 0.250 0.020 -5.34 
Portugal 0.149 0.015 2.24 0.179 0.028 10.11 
Spain 0.452 0.072 21.03 0.529 0.036 10.98 
Sweden 0.422 0.031 2.05 0.461 0.034 -4.71 
Switzerland 0.687 0.035 10.51 0.711 0.021 4.73 
United Kingdom 0.232 0.018 -4.37 0.244 0.017 1.21 
United States 0.563 0.031 8.55 0.623 0.019 1.95 
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Figure 1: Decentralization of total expenditure and economic growth in the OECD. 
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Figure 2: Decentralization of total revenue and economic growth in the OECD. 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics. 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Observations Comments 
Economic growth 0.022 0.014 -0.013 0.087 231 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Total expenditure 0.387 0.139 0.123 0.672 231 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Total revenue 0.423 0.155 0.124 0.723 231 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Current expenditure 0.597 0.182 0.140 0.857 209 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Capital expenditure 0.611 0.183 0.018 0.869 176 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Economic affairs expenditure 0.413 0.190 0.053 0.755 198 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Health expenditure 0.541 0.319 0.015 0.990 198 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Education expenditure 0.559 0.275 0.086 0.978 198 Time varying (annual) 
Fiscal decen.: Social protection expenditure 0.363 0.208 0.031 0.733 198 Time varying (annual) 
Political decentralization (Schneider) 0.710 0.205 0.290 0.930 21 Time invariant 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al) 2.507 1.614 0.000 5.000 209 Time varying (annual) 
Administrative decentralization 0.512 0.188 0.120 0.830 21 Time invariant 
GDP per capita 21792.6 7761.8 4891.6 46277.6 231 Time varying (annual) 
Physical capital 2.743 0.422 1.744 3.597 231 Time varying (annual) 
Human capital 9.001 1.889 4.330 12.250 220 Time varying (annual) 
Population growth 0.006 0.004 0.000 0.018 231 Time varying (annual) 
Trade openness 0.751 0.434 0.205 2.790 231 Time varying (annual) 
Public sector size 0.426 0.134 0.144 0.849 231 Time varying (annual) 
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Table 4: The impact of the degree of decentralization of total expenditure on economic growth. 
 
Explanatory variables (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) (4.4) (4.5) (4.6) (4.7) 
        
Constant 0.034*** 0.044*** 0.058 0.067* 0.069* 0.080** 0.219*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.040) (0.043) 
Fiscal decentralization: Total expenditure -0.029*** -0.019** -0.052*** -0.090* -0.051*** -0.092* -0.031*** 
 
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.049) (0.012) (0.048) (0.011) 
(Fiscal decentalization: Total expenditure)2 
   
0.045 
 
0.049 
 
    
(0.052) 
 
(0.051) 
 
Political decentralization (Schneider) 
 
-0.004 
  
0.006 0.006 
 
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al) 
      
-0.002** 
       
(0.001) 
Administrative decentralization 
 
-0.022** 
  
-0.011* -0.011* -0.010 
  
(0.009) 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
-0.009** -0.010** -0.010** -0.011** -0.026*** 
   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Physical capital 
  
0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 0.009** 0.008** 
   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Human capital 
  
0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 
  
0.489 0.501 0.317 0.332 0.701** 
   
(0.380) (0.388) (0.336) (0.344) (0.309) 
Trade openness 
  
0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
   
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Public sector size 
  
0.016** 0.019** 0.012 0.015* 0.003 
   
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
F-test 10.50*** 5.65*** 6.56*** 5.57*** 5.88*** 5.08*** 8.62*** 
Adjusted R2 0.078 0.145 0.315 0.316 0.336 0.338 0.457 
Countries 21 21 20 20 20 20 19 
Observations 231 231 220 220 220 220 209 
Notes: The dependent variable is in all cases the average growth of real per capita GDP over five-year periods. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent 
standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 5: The impact of the degree of decentralization of total revenue on economic growth. 
 
Explanatory variables (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7.) 
        
Constant 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.061 0.070* 0.075* 0.087** 0.236*** 
 
(0.004) (0.006) (0.041) (0.042) (0.040) (0.042) (0.043) 
Fiscal decentralization: Total revenue -0.025*** -0.017** -0.031*** -0.064 -0.029*** -0.072* -0.019** 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.043) (0.009) (0.039) (0.008) 
(Fiscal decentralization: Total revenue)2 
   
0.037 
 
0.050 
 
    
(0.048) 
 
(0.042) 
 
Political decentralization (Schneider) 
 
-0.005 
  
0.002 0.002 
 
  
(0.007) 
  
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al) 
      
-0.003*** 
       
(0.001) 
Administrative decentralization 
 
-0.023** 
  
-0.015** -0.016** -0.011* 
  
(0.009) 
  
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP per capita (log) 
  
-0.009** -0.009** -0.010** -0.010** -0.027*** 
   
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Physical capital 
  
0.009** 0.009*** 0.008** 0.007** 0.008** 
   
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Human capital 
  
0.002** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.005*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 
  
0.576 0.602* 0.439 0.474 0.721** 
   
(0.401) (0.362) (0.348) (0.358) (0.314) 
Trade openness 
  
0.011** 0.012*** 0.009** 0.009** 0.008** 
   
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Public sector size 
  
0.020** 0.022* 0.015** 0.018** 0.002 
   
(0.008) (0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adjusted R2 0.070 0.146 0.258 0.258 0.285 0.288 0.444 
F test 9.67*** 5.75*** 5.31*** 6.22*** 4.98*** 4.21*** 7.82*** 
Countries 21 21 20 20 20 20 19 
Observations 231 231 220 220 220 220 209 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table 6: The impact of the degree of decentralization of current and capital expenditures on economic growth. 
 
Explanatory variables (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) (6.8) 
Constant 0.243*** 0.269*** 0.300*** 0.352*** 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.047) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053) (0.064) (0.064) 
Fiscal decent.: Current expenditure -0.045*** 0.072** -0.052*** 0.088**     
 (0.009) (0.030) (0.009) (0.035)     
(Fiscal decent.: Current expenditure) 2  -0.109***  -0.132***     
  (0.028)  (0.033)     
Fiscal decent.: Capital expenditure     -0.031*** -0.027 -0.036*** -0.004 
     (0.008) (0.030) (0.007) (0.030) 
(Fiscal decent.: Capital expenditure) 2      -0.004  -0.030 
      (0.026)  (0.027) 
Political decentralization (Schneider)   0.021*** 0.023***   0.024*** 0.027*** 
   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Administrative decentralization   -0.002 0.014**   0.005 0.009 
   (0.005) (0.006)   (0.006) (0.006) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.039*** -0.048*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Physical capital 0.010*** 0.008** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Human capital 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 0.889*** 0.622** 0.582* 0.390 1.215*** 1.219*** 1.006*** 1.052*** 
 (0.344) (0.298) (0.305) (0.273) (0.380) (0.380) (0.378) (0.389) 
Trade openness 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
Public sector size 0.021*** 0.008 0.016** 0.004 0.021** 0.021** 0.016* 0.012 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Adjusted R2 0.433 0.496 0.496 0.558 0.420 0.417 0.494 0.497 
F test 9.47*** 9.36*** 9.14*** 8.91*** 6.24*** 5.40*** 6.35*** 5.51*** 
Countries 19 19 19 19 16 16 16 16 
Observations 209 209 209 209 176 176 176 176 
Notes: See Table 4.
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Table 7: The impact of the degree of decentralization of economic affairs and health expenditures on economic growth. 
 
Explanatory variables (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) 
Constant 0.323*** 0.333*** 0.372*** 0.378*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.182*** 0.199*** 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.056) (0.060) 
Fiscal decent.: Economic affairs expenditure -0.038*** 0.019 -0.043*** 0.007     
 (0.007) (0.035) (0.007) (0.032)     
(Fiscal decent.: Economic affairs expenditure) 2  -0.067*  -0.059*     
  (0.038)  (0.035)     
Fiscal decent.: Health expenditure     -0.012** 0.006 -0.011** 0.016 
     (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.016) 
(Fiscal decent.: Health expenditure) 2      -0.017  -0.024* 
      (0.011)  (0.013) 
Political decentralization (Schneider)   0.016** 0.016**   0.008 0.012 
   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Administrative decentralization   -0.010* -0.010*   -0.004 0.004 
   (0.006) (0.006)   (0.007) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.042*** -0.044*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.024*** -0.026*** 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) 
Physical capital 0.007** 0.004 0.005* 0.003 0.010** 0.009** 0.009** 0.007** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Human capital 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.003** 0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 1.420*** 1.427*** 1.058*** 1.070*** 1.443*** 1.388*** 1.244*** 1.241*** 
 (0.351) (0.351) (0.333) (0.334) (0.465) (0.453) (0.437) (0.432) 
Trade openness 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013** 0.015*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Public sector size -0.006 0.005 -0.014 -0.004 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) 
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.496 0.540 0.547 0.346 0.353 0.352 0.362 
F test 8.96*** 8.69*** 8.89*** 8.79*** 5.79*** 5.36*** 4.93*** 4.74*** 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Notes: See Table 4.
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Table 8: The impact of the degree of decentralization of education and social protection expenditures on economic growth. 
 
Explanatory variables (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.8) 
Constant 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.354*** 0.370*** 0.213*** 0.181*** 0.247*** 0.220*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.053) (0.052) (0.050) (0.050) (0.055) (0.056) 
Fiscal decent.: Education expenditure -0.029*** -0.053* -0.040*** -0.020     
 (0.005) (0.030) (0.007) (0.025)     
(Fiscal decent.: Education expenditure) 2  0.020  -0.017     
  (0.023)  (0.020)     
Fiscal decent.: Social protection expenditure     -0.008 -0.051* -0.010* -0.055* 
     (0.005) (0.028) (0.006) (0.030) 
(Fiscal decent.: Social protection expenditure) 2      0.057  0.059 
      (0.037)  (0.038) 
Political decentralization (Schneider)   0.028*** 0.030***   0.013 0.014* 
   (0.008) (0.008)   (0.008) (0.008) 
Administrative decentralization   0.012* 0.013*   -0.002 0.004 
   (0.007) (0.007)   (0.007) (0.007) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.045*** -0.047*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.029*** -0.027*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Physical capital 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.005 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Human capital 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.002** 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 0.637** 0.640* 0.190 0.154 1.117** 1.127*** 0.869** 0.945** 
 (0.321) (0.329) (0.326) (0.326) (0.435) (0.419) (0.414) (0.400) 
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Public sector size 0.000 0.005 -0.010 -0.015 0.021** 0.019** 0.018** 0.017** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.440 0.521 0.522 0.325 0.334 0.345 0.352 
F test 8.74*** 8.49*** 9.59*** 9.49*** 5.21*** 4.73*** 4.40*** 4.26*** 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table A1: The impact of the degree of decentralization of current and capital expenditures on economic growth (using Hooghe et al., 2008). 
 
Explanatory variables (A1.1) (A1.2) (A1.3) (A1.4) (A1.5) (A1.6) (A1.7) (A1.8) 
Constant 0.243*** 0.269*** 0.243*** 0.278*** 0.253*** 0.251*** 0.220*** 0.223*** 
 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052) (0.051) 
Fiscal decent.: Current expenditure -0.045*** 0.072** -0.031*** 0.085**     
 
(0.009) (0.030) (0.009) (0.034) 
    
(Fiscal decent.: Current expenditure) 2  -0.109***  -0.110***     
  
(0.028) 
 
(0.031) 
    
Fiscal decent.: Capital expenditure     -0.031*** -0.027 -0.021** -0.044 
     
(0.008) (0.030) (0.010) (0.032) 
(Fiscal decent.: Capital expenditure) 2      -0.004  0.025 
      
(0.026) 
 
(0.029) 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al.)   -0.002** -0.002**   -0.002 -0.002 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Administrative decentralization   -0.012** 0.000   -0.009 -0.012* 
   
(0.006) (0.006) 
  
(0.006) (0.007) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.031*** -0.035*** -0.029*** -0.036*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.026*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Physical capital 0.010*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.013*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Human capital 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 0.889*** 0.622** 0.705** 0.575** 1.215*** 1.219*** 1.027*** 0.948*** 
 
(0.344) (0.298) (0.301) (0.275) (0.380) (0.380) (0.355) (0.343) 
Trade openness 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Public sector size 0.021*** 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.021** 0.021** 0.012 0.014 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) 
Adjusted R2 0.433 0.495 0.469 0.511 0.420 0.417 0.429 0.430 
F test 9.47*** 9.36*** 8.36*** 8.10*** 6.24*** 5.40*** 5.16*** 4.83*** 
Countries 19 19 19 19 16 16 16 16 
Observations 209 209 209 209 176 176 176 176 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table A2: The impact of the degree of decentralization of economic affairs and health expenditures on growth (using Hooghe et al., 2008). 
 
Explanatory variables (A2.1) (A2.2) (A2.3) (A2.4) (A2.5) (A2.6) (A2.7) (A2.8) 
Constant 0.323*** 0.333*** 0.320*** 0.332*** 0.159*** 0.156*** 0.179*** 0.180*** 
 
(0.050) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.043) 
Fiscal decent.: Economic affairs expenditure -0.038*** 0.019 -0.042*** 0.014     
 
(0.007) (0.035) (0.010) (0.033) 
    
(Fiscal decent.: Economic affairs expenditure) 2  -0.067*  -0.067*     
  
(0.038) 
 
(0.039) 
    
Fiscal decent.: Health expenditure     -0.012** 0.006 -0.013*** -0.005 
     
(0.005) (0.013) (0.004) (0.013) 
(Fiscal decent.: Health expenditure) 2      -0.017  -0.007 
      
(0.011) 
 
(0.011) 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al.)   0.000 0.000   -0.004*** -0.004*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Administrative decentralization   -0.016** -0.015**   -0.014** -0.012 
   
(0.007) (0.007) 
  
(0.007) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.036*** -0.039*** -0.035*** -0.037*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Physical capital 0.007** 0.004 0.005* 0.003 0.010** 0.009** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) 
Human capital 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.002** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 1.420*** 1.427*** 1.201*** 1.235*** 1.443*** 1.388*** 0.962*** 0.978*** 
 
(0.351) (0.351) (0.374) (0.378) (0.465) (0.453) (0.336) (0.334) 
Trade openness 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.008** 0.008** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) 
Public sector size -0.006 0.005 -0.011 -0.000 0.035*** 0.035*** 0.019** 0.019** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adjusted R2 0.486 0.495 0.506 0.515 0.346 0.352 0.457 0.455 
F test 8.96*** 8.69*** 7.87*** 7.94*** 5.79*** 5.36*** 6.68*** 6.12*** 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table A3: The impact of the degree of decentralization of education and social protection expenditures on growth (using Hooghe et al., 2008). 
 
Explanatory variables (A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) (A3.4) (A3.5) (A3.6) (A3.7) (A3.8) 
Constant 0.254*** 0.244*** 0.252*** 0.243*** 0.213*** 0.181*** 0.234*** 0.214*** 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.046) 
Fiscal decent.: Education expenditure -0.029*** -0.053* -0.019*** -0.041     
 
(0.005) (0.030) (0.005) (0.030) 
    
(Fiscal decent.: Education expenditure) 2  0.020  0.018     
  
(0.023) 
 
(0.023) 
    
Fiscal decent.: Social protection expenditure     -0.008 -0.051* -0.003 -0.034 
     
(0.005) (0.028) (0.006) (0.030) 
(Fiscal decent.: Social protection expenditure) 2      0.057  0.040 
      
(0.037) 
 
(0.040) 
Political decentralization (Hooghe et al.)   -0.002** -0.002**   -0.003*** -0.003*** 
   
(0.001) (0.001) 
  
(0.001) (0.001) 
Administrative decentralization   -0.007 -0.007   -0.014* -0.010 
   
(0.007) (0.007) 
  
(0.007) (0.008) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.025*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.024*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Physical capital 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.005* 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.006* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) 
Human capital 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.002** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Population growth 0.637** 0.640* 0.601* 0.602* 1.117** 1.127*** 0.735** 0.797** 
 
(0.321) (0.329) (0.322) (0.327) (0.435) (0.419) (0.349) (0.357) 
Trade openness 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.009** 0.010*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Public sector size 0.000 0.005 -0.000 0.004 0.021** 0.019** 0.007 0.006 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Adjusted R2 0.438 0.440 0.453 0.453 0.325 0.334 0.425 0.427 
F test 8.74*** 8.50*** 7.73*** 7.78*** 5.21*** 4.73*** 6.21*** 5.38*** 
Countries 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Observations 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 198 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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